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STATUTES 
Rule 56(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
....The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if 
the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if 
any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to 
a judgment as a matter of law. 
Rule 56(d), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
If on motion under this Rule judgment is not rendered 
upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a 
trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the 
motion, by examining the pleadings and the evidence 
before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if practicable 
ascertain what material facts are actually and in good 
faith controverted. It shall thereupon make an order 
specifying the facts that appear without substantial 
controversy, including the extent to which the amount 
of damages or other relief is not in controversy, and 
directing such further proceedings in the action as are 
just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified 
shall be deemed established, and the trial shall be 
conducted accordingly. 
Rule 56(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal 
knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible 
in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant 
is competent to testify to the matters stated therein.... 
ii 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Genuine issues as to material facts existed and the lower 
court erred in granting Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment. 
Regarding Plaintiff's claim of battery no evidence was 
presented by Defendant to support its Motion for Summary 
Judgment; thus granting the Motion was in error. 
The question of damages remains at issue since Defendant's 
expert addressed only the question of permanent damages. 
Denial of access to other patient's medical records was 
error because divulging the information would not violate 
confidentiality of patient. 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
BEN K. HOOPIIAINA, 
Appellant, 
vs. 
INTERMOUNTAIN HEALTH CARE, 
dba LDS HOSPITAL, and 
JANE DOE, 
Respondent. 
Case No. 20310 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant initiated this action in the Third District 
Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, praying for 
Judgment against the Defendant for damages resulting from the 
wrongful administration of drugs. The Defendant gave the Plain-
tiff a drug or drugs that were intended for another patient. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The Third District Court, the Honorable Dean E. Conder, 
Judge presiding, entered its Order of Dismissal the 1st day of 
October, 1984, granting the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judg-
ment, dismissing the Plaintiff's Complaint with prejudice. 
1 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On January 5, 1981, the Plaintiff was admitted to the 
hospital known as Intermountain Health Care dba LDS Hospital 
for evaluation, observation, care and treatment as a patient. 
On the 9th day of January, 1981, Wilda K. Cruz, a 
registered nurse employed by the Defendant hospital, administered 
a single 200 mg. tablet of Quinidine to the Plaintiff. (See 
Cruz Affidavit R). This drug was given in error to the Plain-
tiff and was ordered for a heart patient located in the same 
room as Plaintiff. (.See Plaintiff's Counter Affidavit paragraph 
4 R). 
The Plaintiff claims that he was given a drug prior 
to 12:00 P.M. January 8, 1981, which drug made him ill. After 
1:00 A.M. on January 9, 1981, he was given additional drugs. 
(See Plaintiff's Counter Affidavit ). 
The Plaintiff was to be released on January 9, 1981, 
according to the Plaintiff's doctor. After receiving the drug 
Quinidine and whatever else was given to him on the evening of 
January 8th and the morning of the 9th, he became ill. He 
remained in the hospital until he was released January 12, 1981. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. Genuine issues as to material facts existed and the lower 
court erred in granting Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment. 
2. Regarding Plaintiff's claim of battery no evidence was 
presented by Defendant to support its Motion for Summary 
Judgment; thus granting the Motion was in error. 
3. The question of damages remains at issue since Defendant's 
expert addressed only the question of permanent damages. 
4. Denial of access to other patient's medical records 
was error because divulging the information would not 
violate confidentiality of patient. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THAT GENUINE ISSUES OF FACT EXISTED FOR THE LOWER 
COURT AND THE GRANTING OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS ERROR. 
Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure reads 
in part as follows: 
Pvulc 56(c).... The judgment sought shall be rendered 
forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers 
to interrogatories and admissions on file, together 
with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the 
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law. 
It will be noted that a summary judgment can be granted 
only when it is shown that there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and that the moving party also is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law under those facts. The court cannot 
consider the weight of testimony or the credibility of witnesses 
in considering a motion for summary judgment. The judge simply 
determines that there is no disputed issue of material fact and 
that as a matter of law a party should prevail. Singleton v. 
Alexander, 19 Utah 2d 292, 431 P.2d 126 (1967). 
The purpose of the motion for summary judgment is to 
provide a means for searching out the undisputed facts as shown 
by the submissions to the court, i.e., the pleadings, depositions, 
admissions and answers to interrogatories and documents; and if 
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on that basis the controversy can be settled as a matter of law, 
that will save the time, trouble and expense of a trial. Rich 
v. McGovern, 551 P.2d 1266 (1976). 
The prominence of the comprehensive work Federal 
Practice and Procedure by Barren and Holtzoff has been cited in 
virtually every case construing the modern rules of civil pro-
cedure and has been cited with approval in this jurisdiction. 
While this treatise deals with the federal rules, Rule 56 of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is identical to the federal 
rules. Section 1234 at page 129 of this treatise states clearly 
the appellant's assertion herein as follows: 
It is sometimes said....that Rule 56 does not 
permit "trial by affidavits11. The correct 
principal which the epithet tends to conceal 
is that affidavits may be used on a motion 
for summary judgment, but that the court may 
not resolve disputed fact issues by reference 
to the affidavits. On a motion for summary 
judgment the court cannot summarily try factual 
issues. In ruling on the motion the court may 
consider only facts which are not in dispute or 
the dispute of which raises no substantial issue. 
The motion should be granted only when all of the 
facts entitling the moving party to judgment are 
admitted or clearly established. 
In the instant case, affidavits and interrogatories were 
submitted by both Plaintiff and Defendant. Judge Conder stated 
in his memorandum decision that the basis for granting the Defend-
ant's motion for summary judgment was the failure of the Plaintiff 
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to provide a medical doctor to testify as to causation. (Memo-
randum Decision dated September 17, 1984 R.) Thus, his decision 
was not based on the requirement that there were no facts in 
issue but on the competency of the affiant. 
Rule 56(e) provides that M...affidavits shall be made 
on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be 
admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the 
affiant is competent to testify as to the matters stated therein." 
The affidavits of the Plaintiff (See Affidavits of Dr. Peat and 
Nurse Cruz R) addressed the issue of one dose of the drug 
Quinidine which admittedly was given to Ben Hoopiiaina by mistake. 
Mr. Hoopiiaina states in his counter affidavit (See Plaintiff's 
counter affidavit R) that he was given the medication on two 
occasions and additionally was mistakenly given blood thinner. 
Although Mr. Hoopiiaina is not competent to testify to the 
medical effects of an improperly administered dose of Quinidine, 
he is competent to testify to the fact that he was mistakenly 
administered drugs on three occasions during a defined time 
period. Thus, there is a material fact in issue—the amount of 
drugs administered in error to Mr. Hoopiiaina. 
In Farrow v. Health Services Corp., 604 P.2d 474 (Utah 
1979), a malpractice action, the basis for granting the Defendant's 
motion for summary judgment was the fact that the Plaintiff could 
not make a prima facie case at trial. This court reversed the 
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ruling allowing the Defendant's motion for summary judgment. 
It said the testimony of the nurse which showed that the 
physician's 8:00 p.m. order for the immediate administration 
of medication which was not administered until 10:00 p.m. gave 
rise to an issue of a material fact precluding summary judgment. 
This is similar to Mr. Hoopiiainafs situation; however, instead 
cf having been given a drug at an improper time, he was given 
an improper drug. 
The contentions as to the facts of a party opposing a 
motion for summary judgment should be considered in the light 
most favorable to him, and only if it clearly appears that he 
could not establish a right to recovery under the law should 
such action be taken; any doubts which exist should be resolved 
in favor of affording him the privilege of a trial. Reliable 
Furniture Co. v. Fidelity & Guard. Ins. Under., 16 Utah 2d 211, 
398 P.2d 685 (1965). Such showing must preclude all reasonable 
possibility that the loser could, if given a trial, produce 
evidence which would reasonably sustain a judgment in his favor. 
Bullock v. Desert Dodge Truck Center, Inc., 354 P.2d 559 (1960). 
The Defendant in the instant case avers that one drug dosage was 
given to the Plaintiff. Mr. Hoopiiaina states that he was given 
medication on three occasions; his contentions as to the facts 
should be considered in the light most favorable to him. 
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Ordinarily, questions of negligence may not be settled 
on a motion for summary judgment, but summary judgment is a 
proper method of eliminating a negligence case which has no 
merit when there is no showing of Defendant's negligence. Preston 
v. Lamb, 20 Utah 2d 260, 436 P.2d 1021 (1968); Corbridge v. 
M. Morrin and Sons, Inc., 19 Utah 2d 409, 432 P.2d 41 (1967). 
When it comes to determining negligence, contributory negligence, 
and causation, courts are not in such good position to make a 
total determination for here enters a prerogative of the jury to 
make a determination of its own, and that is: Did the conduct 
of a party measure up to that of the reasonably prudent man, and, 
if not, was it a proximate cause of the harm done? Singleton v. 
Alexander, supra. This is particularly true in malpractice suits 
where the attendant facts are peculiarly within the knowledge of 
the movants and the showing of negligence is generally dependent 
upon expert testimony as to the standard of care required and 
observed. 6 Moore Federal Practice, §56.17(42), page 56-946; 
Lab v. Hall, 200 So. 2d 556 (1967). 
In Controlled Receivables, Inc. v. Harver, 17 Utah 2d 
420, 431 P.2d 807 (1966), this court stated that a motion for 
summary judgment is a "harsh measure". The summary disposal of 
a case serves a salutary purpose in avoiding the time, trouble and 
expense of a trial when it is justified. But unless it is clearly 
so, there are other evils to be guarded against. A party with a 
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legitimate cause, but who is unable to afford an appeal, may 
be turned away without his day in court; or, when an appeal is 
taken, if a reversal results and a trial is ordered, the time, 
trouble and expense is increased rather than diminished. It 
is to avoid these evils and to safeguard the right of access 
to the courts for the enforcement of rights and the remedy of 
wrongs by a trial, and by a jury if desired, that it is of such 
importance that the court should take care to see that the 
party adversely affected has a fair opportunity to present his 
contentions against precipitate action which will deprive him 
of that privilege. Reliable Furniture Co. v. Fidelity & Guar. 
Ins. Under., supra. By granting the Defendant's motion for 
summary judgment, Mr. Hoopiiaina was denied an opportunity to 
present his contentions—was denied his day in court. 
POINT II 
THAT THE CLAIM OF BATTERY REMAINS IN CONTROVERSY 
AND IT WAS THEREFORE IMPROPER FOR THE LOWER COURT 
TO GRANT DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Under Rule 56(d), summary judgment can be rendered upon 
less than the whole case. By examining the pleadings and the 
evidence before it, the court shall ascertain what material facts 
exist without substantial controversy and what material facts are 
actually in good faith controverted. The court then shall direct 
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such further proceedings in the action as are just. Rule 56(d) 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
In its Motion for Summary Judgment, the Defendant moved 
for judgment in its favor on all claims asserted (See Motion for 
Summary Judgment R. page 1). In support of the motion, the 
Defendant submitted affidavits of Wilda K. Cruz, R.N., and 
Michael Alan Peat, Ph. D. (See Affidavits of Nurse Cruz and Dr. 
Peat R) which both addressed the medical malpractice aspect of 
this case, specifically the issue of administration of the drug 
Quinidine. 
As part of his Complaint, Mr. Hoopiiaina alleges in 
paragraphs 33, 34, 57, and 58 (See Complaint R. pages 7 and 11) 
an intentional, unpermitted and offensive contact, i.e., a 
battery committed upon him by the Defendant. No evidence re-
garding this claim was presented by the Defendant to support its 
Motion for Summary Judgment. This claim remains controverted, 
and under Rule 56(d), it was improper for Judge Conder to dismiss 
the entire case against the Defendant. It was particularly 
improper considering the fact that Judge Conder stated in his 
memorandum decision (See Memorandum Decision dated September 17, 
1984 R) that the basis for granting the Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment was the failure of the Plaintiff to provide a 
medical doctor to testify as to causation. Even if it were 
appropriate to dismiss the medical malpractice claim, at minimum, 
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partial summary judgment would apply and the battery cause of 
action should continue in the case. 
POINT III 
THAT THE QUESTION OF DAMAGES 'REMAINS AT ISSUE 
SINCE DEFENDANT'S EXPERT ADDRESSED ONLY THE 
QUESTION OF PERMANENT DAMAGES 
Mr. Hoopiiaina entered the hospital January 5, 1981, 
and was told by his doctor four days later that he would be 
released the following day, January 9, 1981 (See Deposition of 
Plaintiff R. pages 10, 13, 42, 43). He states that in preparation 
for his release on January 9, release papers had been signed, his 
family had delivered clothes to him to wear upon his release, and 
he had made arrangements with his family to pick him up. 
(Deposition R. page 43). 
Mr. Hoopiiaina was given drugs by mistake on January 9, 
became extremely ill, and as a result re>mained in the hospital 
until January 12. The treatment during the additional three days 
of hospitalizaLion was given in response to Mr. Hoopiiainafs 
adverse reaction to the improper drug admittedly administered by 
the Defendant. Mr. Hoopiiaina!s hospital bill included the 
expenses of three additional days1 room charges, medication and 
treatment given to counteract the effects of the improper drug, 
and the approximate $500 expense of a portable oxygen unit Mr. 
Hoopiiaina was required to purchase to support his breathing 
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upon his release. 
In his Affidavit (Affidavit of Michael Allan Peat, 
Ph.D., R. page 3), the Defendant's expert witness states that 
it is his professional opinion that a single dose of Quinidine 
did not cause the permanent pulmonary and cardiovascular problems 
and related difficulties suffered by Mr, Hoopiiaina. Nowhere 
has the issue of the specific monetary damages suffered by Mr. 
Hoopiiaina been dealt with. 
It is unconscionable for the Defendant to admit im-
properly administering a drug to Mr. Hoopiiaina and then require 
him to bear the expenses of additional hospitalization, treatment, 
and equipment to counteract the mistake. 
POINT IV 
THAT DENIAL OF ACCESS TO OTHER PATIENT1S MEDICAL 
RECORDS WAS ERROR BECAUSE DIVULGING THE INFORMATION 
WOULD NOT VIOLATE CONFIDENTIALITY OF PATIENT 
Defendant admitted that the Plaintiff was given a dose 
of the drug Quinidine on January 9, 1981 (Affidavit of Wilda K. 
Cruz, R.N. R). The Plaintiff requested that the Defendant 
divulge information contained in the record of the patient who 
was intended to receive the drug which was given to Mr. Hoop-
iiaina by mistake. The Defendant refused to provide this inform-
ation, claiming it was irrelevant and confidential. Plaintiff 
applied to the court for the information through its Motion To 
12 
Compel. The motion was denied (Order dated March, 1984 R). 
The information contained in the other patient's 
medical records is highly relevant to Mr. Hoopiiaina. Although 
the Defendant claims there was only one drug dosage given to the 
Plaintiff, Mr. Hoopiiaina contends there was additional medication 
administered. The medical records of the other patient would 
easily provide information as to the number of times drugs were 
prescribed and administered and the strength of the doses. This 
would be extremely valuable information to Mr. Hoopiiaina in 
determining the amount of drugs he was given in error. 
Admittedly, hospital records are confidential. Hospital 
rules and regulations for the State of Utah require that: 
A medical record shall be maintained for every 
patient admitted for care in the hospital or 
examined in the emergency room, and such records 
shall be kept confidential. 
Utah Hospital Rules and Regulations, Medical Records Department 
§V8a (1977 Revision). The Plaintiff was not interested in the 
identity of the other patient, but was interested only in the 
number of doses and the strength of the medication prescribed 
and given for that patient. The purpose of the hospital rules 
and regulations is to protect the privacy of the patient. 
Providing only the information regarding the quantity of drugs 
would not violate the patient's privacy or the purpose of the 
regulations but would provide valuable information to the 
Plaintiff. 
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CONCLUSION 
The lower court erred in granting the Defendant's 
Motion for Summary Judgment because there was a genuine issue 
of a material fact, the Motion for Summary Judgment was not 
supported by evidence to extinguish Plaintiff1s battery claim, 
only the issue of permanent damages was dealt with by Defendant, 
and Plaintiff was improperly denied access to relevant medical 
records. 
A review of the facts shows that the lower court erron-
eously used the granting for summary judgment against the 
Plaintiff as a substitute for the trial of disputed issues 
between the parties. For this reason the order of dismissal 
should be vacated and the case remanded for further proceedings. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this J/_ day of flfai£j{, 1985, 
MATT BILJANIC 
Attorney for 
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